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Fair Rewards
Innovation, Patents, Copyrights and Fair Rewards vs. Time, Population, Communications and Fair Use | |
While the fundamental rationale for the existence of
Patents and Copyrights has not changed since their
inception, there is today a widespread perception that
"the
System is broken". Innovators are claiming to be
harmed
as much as helped by that System, for example. In this
Essay an attempt
is made to show that the major causes
of that problem are population growth and
communications
speed, and a remedy is proposed.
(Part I) A Tale of Two Eras
A look at a history of Patent Law (linked) reveals that
the
idea may have existed since the days of ancient Greece.
And Copyright Law is basically a derivation of Patent
Law,
a direct result of the innovation of the printing press,
which made it easy to copy documents. One thing to
note
is that the Term of a Patent or Copyright has varied
considerably in different times and places. Regardless
of
the details, it is well known that the overall Goal of a
Patent or Copyright Term is to provide the innovator
with
the opportunity to earn a Fair Reward for the effort of
creating the innovation (regardless of whether it was a
gadget or a story).
Let us now examine some details regarding how that
Fair
Reward typically was obtained. Then as now, an
innovator
needed to produce copies of the innovation for sale, and
also find a way to let people know it existed, so that
they
might decide to buy one (or more). Now take a look at
the (linked) graph, regarding the overall population
growth of the human species. It is obvious that
for a long long time population grew quite slowly. Next,
take a look at the history of communications (linked) --it
is just as true that for most of that same long long time,
ideas could not spread much faster than a horse could
run.
The Logical Conclusion is that it was worth granting a
Patent or Copyright for a number of years, simply
because
it could easily take that long for an innovator to receive
a
Fair Reward, the result of slow communications and low
population.
The next aspect of the overall "System is broken"
problem
relates in a different way to population and
communications. It is well known that the majority of
innovations build upon something (or some things) that
had previously been invented. One of the most famous
ways of expressing that fact was penned by Isaac Newton
(linked). So, the first relevant point is that even a
genius
of Newton's caliber needed access to previous
discoveries/innovations. The second relevant point is
the
fact that several decades passed after those discoveries
were made, and before Newton began to build upon them
(linked). What if some other genius had come along
before Newton, and had encountered the same
discoveries
from which Newton had derived his innovations?
That Question brings up the relevant factor of population
-
-not everyone is a genius, and especially not everyone is
a
genius of Isaac Newton's caliber. We may now switch
from
the specific case just mentioned, to the more general
case
of a more ordinary innovation, because even ordinary
innovators do not make up a large fraction of the
population. Logically, therefore, when the population is
small (and the total number of innovators is low) and
communications are slow, it can take considerable time
before Innovation A --or some portion of it-- becomes
incorporated as a part of Innovation B. Thus we might
see
little conflict in the notion of granting Patent or
Copyright
protection for several years, simply because of the low
probability that someone would immediately derive
Innovation B from Innovation A.
On the other hand, due to various random factors, it
might
only take a few days for Innovation B to be imagined.
This
is where the doctrine of Fair Use becomes relevant
(more-
so for Copyrights than for Patents). The most important
fact is that Ideas are not protected so much as
Implementations of those Ideas. Therefore, because it
might be impossible to copy an Idea without also copying
some of its Protected Implementation, the Law allows a
minimal amount of copying (the exact amount of which,
of
course, frequently becomes the subject of a legal
dispute).
Fast-forward to today's Era.
One of the most important and gaining-ground
technologies is called "3D Printing" or "additive
manufacturing". This technology is going to force a
merging of Patent Law with Copyright Law, because the
plans that get fed into such a Printer might be covered
by
Copyright Law, but the thing that gets Printed could well
be covered by Patent Law --and the two Laws have very
different Protection Durations, which can only lead to
confusion and more legal problems, in the absence of
merging the Laws.
Next, today's population and communication situation is
such that it is possible for hundreds of millions of people
to learn about an innovation within hours or days of its
announcement. Since such a population quite naturally
includes a great many more innovators than in the
earlier
Era, Innovations B, C, D, and others can quite quickly be
derived from Innovation A. While this is the simplest
and
most obvious explanation for the rate of today's
technological progress, it also explains why many of
today's
innovators think "the System is broken" --they want to
be
able to sell their Innovations B, C, D, ..., almost before
the ink or paint has dried on Innovation A, and they can't
do it easily because the Patent and Copyright Laws,
protecting Innovation A, were designed for a low-
population-and-slow-communications Era.
(Part II) Toward A Modest Proposal
It may now make sense to think again about that earlier
Era, and ask a Question: "How should the Fair Reward be
measured?" If an Innovation Protection Term length
was,
for example, 20 years, that did not actually equate to
money earned --it was merely an opportunity to earn
money without competition for that length of time.
Well,
how much could actually have been earned in that Era,
for
20 years???
A number of factors must be included in any attempt to
Answer that Question, of which "production cost" and
"sales price" are probably the most important. Those
things not only directly relate to profits/earnings, the
sales-price alone directly affects the Popular Demand for
the innovation. If you invent an earth-moving machine
and must sell it for twenty times an average person's
annual wage, you will have fewer customers than if you
sold a child's-toy version of the device, for an
equivalently
small price.
Another factor is Economic Inflation, because prices
might
not stay fixed for the duration of an Innovation
Protection
Term. Inflation basically makes it worthless to talk
about
fixed monetary amounts of earnings. On the other
hand,
the modern Era has given us plenty of experience with
Inflation, and there are known/accepted ways of dealing
with it, such as automatic price adjustments, indexed to
the Inflation rate. And there are other ways of
describing
an income that don't reference monetary amounts at all.
The description "life-style" can imply anything from
"impoverished" to "super-rich" --and the phrase
"maintaining a life-style" manages to convey the concept
of "earning enough money to do that" without being
specific as to quantity.
So, suppose we re-considered the Fair Reward for an
Innovation in terms of "maintaining a life-style". In that
earlier Era, and assuming a particular Innovation sold to
moderate degree, with zero Inflation, how many years
might the Innovator be able to support a modest life-
style
from the total Protected-Term proceeds of the
Innovation?
(In other words, gather up all the sales data for the
Protection Term, figure the profits, and then see how
many years of life-style could those profits support.)
For the purposes of this Essay a numerical value is now
needed, but we can use the Rules of Algebra to call it "X
years", and a great deal of historical data should be
processed in order to arrive at the actual appropriate
value
of "X". Keep in mind that there could be considerable
Debate regarding the known fact that something like 90%
of all Innovations fail to earn a dime --should they be
included in the historical calculations of a maintaining-a-
modest-life-style Fair Reward?
The result of the preceding gives us an easy way to re-
phrase a Patent or Copyright Protection Term. An
example
of such a re-phrasing might be this: "The Protection
Term
ends when you have earned enough to maintain a
modest
life-style for X years." Economic Inflation is
automatically
taken into account. And if the word "you" is taken to
reference either Singular or Plural, then if an Innovation
Team created the Innovation, the Fair Reward would
apply
to all the members of the Team, not just one person.
"You" might even refer to everyone in an entire
corporation, but care must be taken to ensure that
nothing
like "Hollywood accounting" (linked) is employed to
cheat.
The best part of this Proposal is that it applies equally
well
to both the low-population-and-slow-communications Era
and the high-population-and-fast-communications Era.
In
today's Era a newly-released Innovation might only have
a
Protection Term of 3 days, if so many items were sold in
that time such that the profits could meet the "maintain-
a-
modest-life-style-for-X-years" condition. Please keep in
mind that the Original Goal was to provide a Fair Reward
for **Innovation**, not for Greed.... In what way does
this
Proposal fail to offer a Fair Reward for Actual
Innovation?
In closing, we can now re-consider Innovations B, C, D,
...,
derived from Innovation A. If the Protection Term for
Innovation A really-in-practice often is able to shrink
from
years to weeks or even days, because of today's large
population and fast communications, then it becomes
quite easy for the later Innovators to wait for their own
Fair Rewards, instead of feeling that "the System is
broken".
History of patent law
http://en.wikipedia...story_of_patent_law As mentioned in the main text. [Vernon, Nov 19 2013]
Population Graph
http://en.wikipedia...tion#Overpopulation As mentioned in the main text. [Vernon, Nov 19 2013]
History of communications
http://library.thinkquest.org/5729/ As mentioned in the main text. [Vernon, Nov 19 2013]
Newton Quoted
http://www.phrases....eanings/268025.html As mentioned in the main text. [Vernon, Nov 19 2013]
Newton Discovery Timeline
http://www.uwgb.edu...sttech/suncentr.htm As mentioned in the main text. [Vernon, Nov 19 2013]
Hollywood Accounting
http://en.wikipedia...ollywood_accounting As mentioned in the main text. [Vernon, Nov 19 2013]
The case against patents
http://www.tinaja.com/glib/casagpat.pdf Don Lancaster on patents - pdf file, and more useful than a vernon essay. [neelandan, Nov 19 2013]
Trans-Pacific Partnership Leaked Draft
http://wikileaks.org/tpp/ As mentioned by xaviergisz [arvin, Nov 20 2013]
[link]
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Good problem statement, bad solution. The process of determining the apropriate period for each innovation is going to keep the lawyers well-fed, and only corporations will be able to afford to use the system. |
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Many inovations take a lot of capitol to bring to market. A large corporation has the resources to do that quickly. // The Protection Term ends when you have earned enough to maintain a modest life-style for X years // So that means that a corporation that brings the innovation to market quickly ends the time period quickly once they have made their buck (assuming you have some way to measure that), but a weekend inventor could drag it out for years because they don't get their invention to market. While some time difference may be reasonable, there should also be some incentive to get a product to market sooner than later and allow others to build on teh innovation as well. |
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Happy lawyers - now that's something you don't want to see ... |
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I think there is one major, major problem with this
idea. |
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[MaxwellBuchanan], yeah? "In what way does this
Proposal fail to offer a Fair Reward for Actual
Innovation?" |
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[scad mientist], you may be neglecting to think of
Sturgeon's Law, regarding "90% of everything is crud."
Most innovations don't earn a dime because nobody
wants them --and, when that is actually true, it is
probable that almost nobody will be incorporating
them into other Innovations. |
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I don't know - it was too long to read. That was the
problem. Is the idea good enough to put into three
sentences? |
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[MaxwellBuchanan], my proposed solution depends
on the background context. If the context was
badly presented or simply flawed (but not so,
according to [scad mientist]), then there is little
chance the solution could make sense. |
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Nevertheless, the Idea is pretty simple, that the
Protection Term should be associated with the
income an Innovation generates. In the Old Days
it could easily take a whole 20-year Term to
generate a decent income, but that is not true
today, for any truly worthwhile Innovation. |
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There, you see? With a little effort you can do it.
You've saved me (and countable others) minutes of
time by summarizing. |
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So, now, I can point out the flaws in this idea. Who
decides how much revenue an idea should generate? |
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[MaxwellBuchanan] and [lurch], now you know why
you should read the main text. A major reason for
writing that text was to pre-emptively resolve such
issues. The relevant paragraphs, answering the point
you made, begin with "So, suppose we re-
considered" and "For the purposes of this Essay". |
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Don Lancaster had a write up about patents. He said that a patent
only conferred the right to go to court, and that for the average
inventor working alone it was more bother than it was worth. |
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They are used as status symbols and bargaining chips by large
entities who already have lawyers on their payroll, who engage in
harassing the smaller fry just to justify their existence. |
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More laws and scope for litigation is not going to improve life. Except
for lawyers. |
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If I understand this correctly, patent protection lasts until the inventor has secured $X in income (either through selling a product incorporating the patent or by licensing it). |
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If so, you are assuming that the "fair reward" for every inventor is exactly the same amount, irrespective of the nature of the invention. I understand that the word fair can have varying definitions but I don't know how this can be considered fair. |
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Compare, for example, a medical device that took a decade of work to perfect, vs a fancy glow on icons when you hover over them that somebody put together in an afternoon. I don't see how it can possibly be fair that both receive the same monetary value of protection. [The current system, where they both receive the same number of years of protection, is also unfair; yours might be an improvement but in my opinion doesn't go far enough] |
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[arvin], this Idea qualifies as Half-Baked because
certain things were not stated precisely. The X
number of years still needs to be computed. |
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The definition of "modest life-style" needs to be
nailed down (not easy when a modest life-style in
the USA can equate with living-like-a-king in
various other places). |
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The possibility that Economic Inflation might
happen at an increased (or decreased!) rate AFTER
the Protection Term ends, and before the X
number of years has passed, wasn't even
mentioned. |
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I made no claim that this Idea was perfect; I only
claimed it was better than the current system,
and offered a rationale as to why. If an additional
factor should be incorporated into the Protection
Term calculations (your own recent post about
originality is quite worthy), I'm fine with that. |
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I agree whole-heartedly agree that patent and copyright
terms are in need of review. A uniform 20 years regardless
of the type of invention is lazy and inefficient. |
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I also agree that identifying the purpose of patents is
essential in determining the optimal term of patents. |
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My opinion diverges from yours in regard to the calculation
of a "Fair Reward". |
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The purpose of a patent is to encourage disclosure (i.e.
publication) of technical information. Without this
encouragement for disclosure, people and companies tend
to keep their inventions secret. Although in theory most
inventions could be 'reverse-engineered' to discover how
they work, this is very inefficient. (Note that more than
80% of technical knowledge resides exclusively in patents.) |
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So a patent is a trade of a limited monopoly for a
disclosure (of that invention). The optimal term for a
patent is the *minimum* number of years of monopoly that
a person/company would be willing to reveal how the
invention works. |
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At this point we would need to do research into what this
optimal term would be. this would need to take into
account that there is an 'eventual inevitability' of almost all
inventions - what is cutting edge and novel now becomes
rudimentary and obvious as time and technology rolls on. |
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Ultimately patents should be an incentive to consolidate
the 'first mover advantage' in commercialising technology.
Patents should not be a tool for speculation, where profit
(through royalties or infringement payments) only requires
to wait for someone else to become the 'first mover'. |
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I'm guessing that the result of the analysis would reveal
much shorter patent terms are optimal, but different
technology would require different terms. So, for example,
patent terms in pharmaceuticals would be significantly
longer than in software. |
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The big elephant-in-the-room of all this discussion is that
the net exporters of intellectual property want the longest
terms of protection possible, regardless of how sub-
optimal and inefficient that may be (i'll leave the reader to
figure out which countries are net exporters). For the latest
chapter in the extending reach of patents see the recently
leaked draft of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. |
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"net exporters of intellectual property want the
longest terms of protection possible" |
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That's just greed. See the second-to-last
sentence of the second-to-last paragraph of the
main text (treat the ellipsis as a sentence-break). |
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[xaviergisz], you may have a good point regarding
the disclosure of a patented innovation's details,
but you are certainly missing some things. |
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First, the earliest things in History given a
Protection Term would typically have been far less
complex than today's inventions --just about
anyone could fully understand how one of those
gadgets worked as soon as it was seen (almost no
reverse engineering needed). |
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Second, Copyrights exist without any notion of
"full disclosure" attached to the things
Copyrighted. They are basically all about the "Fair
Reward" thing. |
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Third, here are a couple quotes from the US.
Constitution:
"The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes [...]"
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries;"
There is nothing in THAT about "full disclosure". |
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So, it is clearly reasonable to think that the idea of
a "Fair Reward" for the Innovation has, historically,
been far more important than "full disclosure". |
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I think you will find that the *actual* purpose of
"full disclosure" is to enable the distinguishing of
similar Innovations from each other in the Legal
System. That is, if an Innovator want to sue
someone for violating the Protection Term, the
Innovator needs to be able to show how the
violator is copying the Protected Innovation --the
Patent precisely describes the Thing Protected,
see? |
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(Copyrighted things are of course inherently "fully
disclosed", so it is often quite easy to detect
plagiarism. Only the degree of copying gets
scrutinized by the Legal System, and that is
entirely because of the existence of the "Fair Use"
notion.) |
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[lurch], thank you for your remarks. I do think you
might have misinterpreted something, though. That
value of "X" mentioned in the main text was
supposed to be computed only once, a generic
answer to the question of how much of a Fair Reward
might be worthy --not computed for every single
patent application. |
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